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Book 3 - John Gray "Straw Dogs"
Jan. 15th, 2016 10:53 amJohn Gray "Straw Dogs : Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals" (Granta)
A problematic, frustrating book that i chucked often in outrage.
Gray argues that humans are no better than other animals; like animals, we are driven mostly by instinct and by half-buried, inchoate passions. We may think that our free will separates us from other animals, but Gray retorts that free will is an illusion - everything in the universe has to have a cause, and why should our decisions be any different? We may think of ourselves as self-aware (unlike, say, plankton) but Gray points out that our everyday experience is one of fragmentation and confusion; the idea of a continuous, consistent identity as an individual is not an ideal we live up to in actual practice. Humans are certainly bigger, stronger, smarter and more adept at controlling their environment than dragonflies, but it's not clear that this is of any ultimate benefit if the result is nuclear war or environmental disaster. We ought to accept that our sense of identity as "persons" is misplaced, that any conception of our free will or autonomy is a pathetic deception, that our lives are of no ultimate significance, and that it would be no great loss to the planet if humans were all killed in some catastrophic disaster. (Gray stops short of actually predicting the collapse of Western democracy and the deaths of billions in a Malthusian population crunch, but only just.)
No so cheery stuff. But it's only the ultimate conclusion of Gray's longstanding critique of Enlightenment rationality and humanism (see, for example, Enlightenment's Wake), which he sees as a secularized version of Christianity. If God doesn't exist and we're not created in his image, why should humanity have any special status? If a walrus doesn't have the power to transcend the limitations of nature and strive toward a just society, what makes us so special? Gray pursues this line of argument relentlessly and unsentimentally: the death of God is not the passing of some petty tyrant, but a major event forcing us to reevaluate our entire worldview and confront all our illusions about ourselves. In this he follows Nietzsche, of course, although even Nietzsche is too optimistic for Gray (no Übermenschen to be found here).
There are problems with his reasoning and presentation, however. To label humanity as self-deceiving, and free will as illusory, implies that the author has access to a privileged perspective free from such delusions - precisely what he condemns in secular humanism. Other points are backed up in odd ways - Gray approvingly cites Alasdair MacIntyre's traditionalist Catholic account of virtue ethics and, while you stare incredulously at him, suddenly starts talking about something else. One gets the sense that there is a certain lack of seriousness at work here; the entire book consists of brief mini-chapters ranging from a single paragraph to a few pages, a device which allows Gray to change the subject whenever he presents some particularly controversial or counterintuitive assertion. You feel as though Gray is still trying these ideas on for size, and that you'll have to buy the sequel if your preference is for sustained argumentation. In the meantime, this is a brief enough book to be worth reading if you want to see an intelligent philosopher pursue a certain atheistic train of thought to its nihilistic logical conclusion.
A problematic, frustrating book that i chucked often in outrage.
Gray argues that humans are no better than other animals; like animals, we are driven mostly by instinct and by half-buried, inchoate passions. We may think that our free will separates us from other animals, but Gray retorts that free will is an illusion - everything in the universe has to have a cause, and why should our decisions be any different? We may think of ourselves as self-aware (unlike, say, plankton) but Gray points out that our everyday experience is one of fragmentation and confusion; the idea of a continuous, consistent identity as an individual is not an ideal we live up to in actual practice. Humans are certainly bigger, stronger, smarter and more adept at controlling their environment than dragonflies, but it's not clear that this is of any ultimate benefit if the result is nuclear war or environmental disaster. We ought to accept that our sense of identity as "persons" is misplaced, that any conception of our free will or autonomy is a pathetic deception, that our lives are of no ultimate significance, and that it would be no great loss to the planet if humans were all killed in some catastrophic disaster. (Gray stops short of actually predicting the collapse of Western democracy and the deaths of billions in a Malthusian population crunch, but only just.)
No so cheery stuff. But it's only the ultimate conclusion of Gray's longstanding critique of Enlightenment rationality and humanism (see, for example, Enlightenment's Wake), which he sees as a secularized version of Christianity. If God doesn't exist and we're not created in his image, why should humanity have any special status? If a walrus doesn't have the power to transcend the limitations of nature and strive toward a just society, what makes us so special? Gray pursues this line of argument relentlessly and unsentimentally: the death of God is not the passing of some petty tyrant, but a major event forcing us to reevaluate our entire worldview and confront all our illusions about ourselves. In this he follows Nietzsche, of course, although even Nietzsche is too optimistic for Gray (no Übermenschen to be found here).
There are problems with his reasoning and presentation, however. To label humanity as self-deceiving, and free will as illusory, implies that the author has access to a privileged perspective free from such delusions - precisely what he condemns in secular humanism. Other points are backed up in odd ways - Gray approvingly cites Alasdair MacIntyre's traditionalist Catholic account of virtue ethics and, while you stare incredulously at him, suddenly starts talking about something else. One gets the sense that there is a certain lack of seriousness at work here; the entire book consists of brief mini-chapters ranging from a single paragraph to a few pages, a device which allows Gray to change the subject whenever he presents some particularly controversial or counterintuitive assertion. You feel as though Gray is still trying these ideas on for size, and that you'll have to buy the sequel if your preference is for sustained argumentation. In the meantime, this is a brief enough book to be worth reading if you want to see an intelligent philosopher pursue a certain atheistic train of thought to its nihilistic logical conclusion.
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